This paper aims to explain the construction of the autonomous subject from Foucault's ethical perspective for the qualitative analysis of interprofessional relationships, patient-professional relationships, and moral ethics critique. Foucault tried to break loose from the self, which is merely the result of a biopolitical subjectivation and constituted an interpersonal level. From this, different elements involved in the decision-making capacity of patients in a clinical setting were analysed. Firstly, the context in which decision-making occurs has been explained, distinguishing between traditional practices involved in self-care and the more modern conceptions that make certain possible transformations. Secondly, an attempt is made to explain the formation of the medicalisation of society using the transformations of what Foucault called "techniques of the self". Finally, the ethical framework for a subject's "self-creation", insisting more on the exercises of self-subjectivation, reinforcing the ethics of the self by itself, the "care of the self", has been explained. The role of the patient is understood as an autonomous subject to the extent that the clinical institution and the professionals involved comprehend how the patient's autonomy in the clinical environment is constituted. All these elements could generate grounded theory on the qualitative methodology of this phenomenon. The current ethical model based on universal principles is not useful to provide a capacity for patients decision-making, relegating to the background their opinions and beliefs. Consequently, a new ethical perspective emerges that aims to return the patient to the fundamental axis of attention.

Kidney transplantation (KT) is often considered to be the method best able to restore fertility in a woman with chronic kidney disease (CKD). However, pregnancies in KT are not devoid of risks (in particular prematurity, small for gestational age babies, and the hypertensive disorders of pregnancy). An ideal profile of the potential KT mother includes "normal" or "good" kidney function (usually defined as glomerular filtration rate, GFR ≥ 60 ml/min), scant or no proteinuria (usually defined as below 500 mg/dl), normal or well controlled blood pressure (one drug only and no sign of end-organ damage), no recent acute rejection, good compliance and low-dose immunosuppression, without the use of potentially teratogen drugs (mycophenolic acid and m-Tor inhibitors) and an interval of at least 1-2 years after transplantation. In this setting, there is little if any risk of worsening of the kidney function. Less is known about how to manage "non-ideal" situations, such as a pregnancy a short time after KT, or one in the context of hypertension or a failing kidney. The aim of this position statement by the Kidney and Pregnancy Group of the Italian Society of Nephrology is to review the literature and discuss what is known about the clinical management of CKD after KT, with particular attention to women who start a pregnancy in non-ideal conditions. While the experience in such cases is limited, the risks of worsening the renal function are probably higher in cases with markedly reduced kidney function, and in the presence of proteinuria. Well-controlled hypertension alone seems less relevant for outcomes, even if its effect is probably multiplicative if combined with low GFR and proteinuria. As in other settings of kidney disease, superimposed preeclampsia (PE) is differently defined and this impairs calculating its real incidence. No specific difference between non-teratogen immunosuppressive drugs has been shown, but calcineurin inhibitors have been associated with foetal growth restriction and low birth weight. The clinical choices in cases at high risk for malformations or kidney function impairment (pregnancies under mycophenolic acid or with severe kidney-function impairment) require merging clinical and ethical approaches in which, beside the mother and child dyad, the grafted kidney is a crucial "third element".

Healthcare professionals may see prolonging life and use of scarce resources as futile if the quality of life of persons with Alzheimer's disease is deemed to be poor. Thus, nurses and other healthcare providers need to question traditional assumptions of quality of life. This article presents a phenomenological study of ethical concerns related to quality of life as described by persons with Alzheimer's disease, family caregivers, and professional caregivers. The theme of "Creating a Quality of Life Through Connected Lives" calls forth an ethics of respect for the individual experience and its connecting relationships.

Although autonomy is clearly still the paradigm in bioethics, there is increasing concern over its value and feasibility. In agreeing with those concerns, I argue that autonomy is not just a status, but a skill, one that must be developed and maintained. I also argue that nearly all health-care interactions do anything but promote such decisional skills, since they rely upon assent, rather than upon genuinely autonomous consent. Thus, throughout most of their medical lives, patients are socialised to be heteronomous, rather than autonomous. Yet, at the worst possible time--critical care decision-making--when life and death consequences are attached to the choices, the paradigm shifts and real consent is sought, even demanded, thereby making an often traumatic situation even harder. I go on, though, to also reject paternalistic models of beneficence as an alternative. Rather, I conclude that the problem is so fundamental in healthcare that a genuine solution would require a radical restructuring. I recommend steps that can be taken in the interim to improve the situation and to move toward such a restructuring.

The construction of menopause as a long-term risk to health and the adoption of discourses of prevention has made necessary a decision by women about medical treatment; specifically regarding the use of hormone replacement therapy. In a study of general practitioners' accounts of menopause and treatment in Australia, women's 'choice', 'informed decision-making' and 'empowerment' were key themes through which primary medical care for women at menopause was presented. These accounts create a position for women defined by the concept of individual choice and an ethic of autonomy. These data are a basis for theorising more generally in this paper. We critically examine the construct of 'informed decision-making' in relation to several approaches to ethics including bioethics and a range of feminist ethics. We identify the intensification of power relations produced by an ethic of autonomy and discuss the ways these considerations inform a feminist ethics of decision-making by women. We argue that an 'ethic of autonomy' and an 'offer of choice' in relation to health care for women at menopause, far from being emancipatory, serves to intensify power relations. The dichotomy of choice, to take or not to take hormone replacement therapy, is required to be a choice and is embedded in relations of power and bioethical discourse that construct meanings about what constitutes decision-making at menopause. The deployment of the principle of autonomy in medical practice limits decision-making by women precisely because it is detached from the construction of meaning and the self and makes invisible the relations of power of which it is a part.